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In this inquiry, a survey is made of some of the significant
quantities in the cotton industry which influence cotton prices and
which are subject to large degrees of variations from one year to
the next. These variations have plagued the cotton industry since the
Great Depression.
More specifically, the problems having to do with quantities
alluded to above which will comprise the crux of this paper are: 1)
a stationary market with increasing production and increasing cost
related to production, 2) competition from non-cotton manufactured
goods and foreign cotton goods, 3) large governmental inventories of
cotton, and 4) the general nature of the foreign cotton market.
Design of Study
Because of the magnitude of government intervention in the
cotton industry and the wealth of information to be found in
government publications on subjects relating to the cotton industry,
heavy reliance has been placed on material from the Department of
Agriculture. Similar pertinent material has also been secured from





The major concern of this exposition has to do with how the
price which producers receive for their cotton is determined. There
fore it will be an industry-embracing study restricted to the con
tinental U.S. More pointedly, the study is confined to the pricing
of American Upland Cotton. This type of cotton is produced in much
larger quantities in the U.S. than any other type of cotton.
The economic history of cotton prices in the U.S. is most
eventful, however, we will not be directly concerned with it; rather
we will seek to concern ourselves with current prices.
Significance of the Study
This study will add to the literature concerning cotton prices
and provide some predictions relative to the future of the industry.
After some investigations, the writer has come to the conclusion that
the statement which holds that, "the farm industry is a sick industry,"
is a true statement. This can be seen easily when one thinks of the
small farmer who cannot sustain himself with the cotton prices which
are the result of competition with other producers of homogeneous
goods for the same markets.
The industry's trend, a declining one, is apparent even to the
casual observer. If this trend is to be re-directed, more helpful
action is necessary. Equally so, the things which would appear to be
of value for the long-run will have to be applied. More specifically,
in the past these things have not been applied in some instances
because of the various pressure groups in the U.S. Congress, so that
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resulting action has been based on the "short-run" logic used by them
apparently for the sake of expediency with little regard about the
long-run. It is with this understanding that we pursue the problem.
A Short History of Cotton in the U. S. Since
the Great Depression
A large portion of agricultural history in the United States is
a history of supply exceeding effective demand; cotton is no ex
ception to this general rule. There are forces from within and without
which make the problems of the cotton industry more complex than
would otherwise be the case.
Because of the multiplicity of problems that had plagued the
farm economy for many years, the Federal government entered the field
of agriculture in 1933 with a stronger hand. It sought to change the
trend in farm prices and to improve the lot of the farmer.
This was done at a time when the farm industry was expressing
a vigorous drive for conservation, a beginning in the decline of total
farm population, an increase in mechanization and surging efficiency
and output, an increase in corporate farming, a decline of the small
family farm, and the appearance of great surpluses.1
Actually, a cotton surplus was beginning to develop in the
decade just prior to 1930, but it became more evident and serious as
a result of the sharp reduction in cotton consumption in the early
years of the depression. The first efforts to deal with the cotton
surplus problem in 1929 through the Farm Board's Cotton Stabilization
Johnson D. Hill and Walter £. Stuerman, Roots in the Soil
(New York: Philosophical Library, 1964).
Corporation were palliative and had no very significant effect on the
industry.
After 1933, the functions performed by the Federal Farm Board
were to be exercised through the Commodity Credit Corporation. Since
the CCC took over, the chief farm problems have been those of dealing
with surpluses which tend to depress prices.
The "New Deal" of President Franklin D. Roosevelt involved one
of the greatest agricultural reform programs in the world's history.
Using price changes in other segments of the economy as an indicator,
we can now see the necessity of such a program. Based on 1909-1914
prices, the agricultural price index was at a low of sixty-five in
1931. The farm price level is an unstable thing moving through time
in broad and dramatic sweeps. Because of the peculiar nature of
farm prices, an idea was developed by farm leaders to show the changes
in farm prices and this relationship to prices in other sectors of the
economy. The maintenance of a comparable relationship between farm
prices and prices in other sectors of the economy is referred to as
parity pricing. Seeking to cope with the harmful trends previously
mentioned, the recommendations of numerous farm groups supplemented
by the advice of the President's counselors, found embodiment in the
I ——
Murray B. Benedict and Oscar Stein, The Agricultural Commodity
Programs (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1956), p. xxi.
2
Willard W. Cochrane, Farm Prices; Myth and Reality (Minneapolis;
University of Minnesota Press, 1958), p. 15.
3
Walter S. Wilcox and Willard W. Cochrane, Economics of American
Agriculture (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1960), 2nd., p. 38.
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Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933* Under this legislation the
practice of parity pricing was embraced and the Secretary of Agri
culture was given the power to lease and to take land out of pro
duction. Hence, the prices for farmers were to be raised via price
supports, and acreage controls was to eliminate surpluses. The aim
was to give the farmers an increased purchasing power relative to the
things they had to buy, equivalent to the period 1909-1914.1 The per-
pound supports for cotton were: 1933, 10 cents; 1934, 12 cents; 1935,
10 cents; 1936, no support; and 1937, 9 cents. These supports ranged
from 53 to 76 per cent of parity.
The doom handed to much of the New Deal legislation was the fate
of the aforementioned Act of 1933. In that same year it was replaced
by the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act which endeavored
to achieve the same ends by controlling the amount of acreage used in
production.
In 1938 a new AAA passed which restored much of the original
act of 1933 and which was upheld by the Supreme Court. It provided
for acreage controls, price-supports loans and crop insurance. It also
made these supports mandatory at not less than 52 per cent and not more
than 75 per cent of parity, (using 1909-1915 as a base period), if
1
Hill and Stuerman, op. cit., p. 31.
2
U. S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Stabilization
and Conservation Service, Background Information No. 9 (November,
1962).
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prices fell below a certain level or if production showed excesses.1
Moreover, non-resource loans were allowed using the goods as collateral
with the agreement that if prices fell, the government would become
owner of the commodity.
Since 1938, price supports at varying percentages of parity have
been the rule rather than the exception. Although the programs have
varied, the trend has been basically the same. These programs have
been seeking to reduce the surpluses and to keep prices stable. This
two-fold task has been difficult because of the nature of the market
for agricultural products.
Using the previously presented material as a launching pad, it
now seems appropriate to quality some of the tendencies. In like
manner some corroborating data is presented which throw more light on
the subject.
From 1900 to 1950 total farm output rose by 75 per cent and out
put per man hour increased by 100 per cent. But in 1950, there were
5.5 million farm units, with 35 per cent being non-profitable economic
enterprises. These non-profitable enterprises were responsible for
only 2 per cent to 3 per cent of the farm products. Cotton production
of course increased. It was 42 per cent higher in 1960, than in 1940,
and 51 per cent higher in 1960 than in 1910. These production heights
were set with a decrease in the amount of total land in production.2
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It can be seen logically that these tendencies toward one pro
duction account in no small degree for the displacement of people who
go to the northern and eastern industrialized communities.
Over production records having been set, one not aware of the
situation would conclude that "happy days" must be here again, but this
is far from the case. For unfortunately, it seems apparent from the
material consulted that market inroads made by various manufactured
goods and the loss of markets to other cotton producting countries
have contributed, in no small degree, to the quagmire that cotton has
been and continues to be engulfed in. Before ascertaining the nature
and sixe of the market for cotton produced in the United States we will
first survey the practices used and the technology employed in pro
duction. The results of these practices have been a decrease in pro
duction cost for some operators and a large supply of cotton in the
United States, in relation to the demand.
CHAPTER I
A SURVEY OF RECEHT TRENDS IN THE INDUSTRY
In the whole of the cotton industry, none is a more discussed
subject than that of the income farmers receive for the products they
produce and sell. This is the case, undoubtedly, because of the long-
run tendency toward falling cotton prices in the absence of price
support, (toe of the primary factors contributing to this long-run
trend is the fact that manufactured goods and cotton produced by
other countries have made significant inroads into markets previously
held by United States cotton producers. And, United States cotton
producers have maintained high production in the face of a diminishing
market.
Production Costs
Before surveying the market conditions, we shall view the trends
in the "production costs." Since cost trends are of paramount im
portance in production, we shall try to see clearly their status in
the industry.
The most dramatic single development in cotton production tech
nology has been the swift change to tractor-powered and other labor-
saving devices. It seems, important for purposes of this analysis,
that a brief look at how mechanization and production methods associated
with it are expressed in terms of differences in cost. To do this,
1
it is necessary that the wide variety of "transitional stages" that are
realized on individual cotton farms be disregarded in order to develop
cost estimates applicable to each of three rather broad levels of
cotton production techniques. These levels are: (1) cotton produced
mainly with animal power and harvested by hand; (2) cotton produced
mainly with tractor power and harvested by hand; and (3) cotton produced
mainly with tractor power and harvested by machine.1
Still another very important consideration is the geographical
location of the production. For in various geographic areas, not only
are the average yields different, but also, the degree of technology
used in production. Thus the cost of production varies for reasons
other than production techniques.
For the purpose of getting a clearer view of the industry, we have
divided the Cotton Belt rather arbitrarily into three groups of areas.
This is done because the process of development in cotton production
technology has not moved forward with equal speed or uniformity in all
parts of the Belt. These differentials can, for the most part, be ex
plained by differences in the adaptability of the natural resources to
mechanization and to other technological improvements. Within the next
few pages some observations are made regarding the general geographic
orientation of these differences as they are expressed in the average
costs of producing cotton.
The first of the three group of areas is the Delta, High Plains
and the Irrigated West. Considered from the standpoint of a combination
1 ■'
.!?* K:J*?™t' ir-' Fra"k A\McCord a«d George Townsend,
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of topography, favorable climate and productive soil, the areas within
this group have in common the fact that they seem to have been most
generously and most extensively endowed with natural advantages con
ducive to the rapid exploitation of new developments in production
technology than with other areas of comparable size. Moreover,
historical evidence seems to suggest that cotton has maintained a
firmer and a more dominant role in the farm economy of these areas than
is generally true of the areas in other groups.
The two other groups of areas are formed by simply using the
Mississippi River as a dividing line, separating the other cotton
areas of the Belt into (1) the other cotton areas of the Southeast and
(2) the Southwest.
The following group of tables shows these relationships more
clearly. At first sight one can see the influence of the geographical
area and the level of mechanization on production costs.
After considering the inadequacies and limitations of these
calculated estimates, the observer can reach certain tentative con
clusions. It indicates for each of the three cost situations (1) the
proportion of the United States crop which "would have been grown"
given the yields used and the 1954 average; (2) the estimated average
cost per pound of lint; (3) the average selling price in 1954, and
(4) the spread between costs and selling price. Taken by itself, this
table suggests that a large part of the crop is produced under cir
cumstances where the cost is pretty close to the selling price, and
therefore, price reductions in this case would be catastrophic to the
producer.
I — ' —
Home, McCord and Townsend, op. cit., p. 43.
TABLE 1
ESTIMATED AVERAGE PRODUCTION COSTS AND SELLING PRICES FOR
THESE LEVELS OF MECHANIZATION IN THREE
GROUPS OF PRODUCTION AREASa
Approximate Per Cent Cost Per Selling Difference
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To complicate the nature of things further, not only have large
percentages of crops been produced under conditions where the spread
between cost and selling price have been small, but the total amount
5
of production has been large relative to demand. As a matter of
record, although from 1959 to 1961, the average amount of production of
about fourteen million bales compared favorably with the total con
sumption during this period. There is another facet which is frequently
overlooked. That is the carry-over or inventory, the greater part of
which was held by the CCC.
Looking further at Table 1, we can see that only 20 per cent of
the cotton crop was produced under the most favorable circumstances in
terms of technology used. More will be shown in this light in a later
table. In like manner, the most favorable group in terms of geo
graphical location produced only 48 per cent of the total crop in the
year. Also 67 per cent of the cotton crop grown fell in Table 1 where
the average spread between cost and price was 4% cents. These
industry-wide inspections are necessary in order that the total view
may be seen as a basis for arriving at justifiable conclusions.
Another important consideration concerning cost is the soil type
used in production. This can be inferred from the preceeding data.
The following table seeks to more closely quantify these differences
in cost. The cost of producing tends to be lowest on those medium to
large farms with sandy soil where advanced technology is used. Such
farms use the newest equipment and scientifically advisable production
practices. An indication of the continuing problem of farm size is
related to cotton farming, as shown by data in the 1959 Census of
Agriculture, which reveals that the average size of 70 per cent of all
commercial farms is 114 acres, or less, and for 50 per cent of such
farms, the average size is 63 acres or less.
TABLE 2
COST PER POUND OF PRODUCING COTTON AS INFLUENCED BY SOIL
























In general less than 100 acres of cropland and considered to
have two-row equipment,
b
More than 100 acres of cropland and with four-row equipment.
From this table one can surmise that in addition to the things
previously mentioned the cost of producing cotton is affected, in a
large degree, by the (1) soil type, (2) farm size, and (3) the level
of technology employed. These type farms in the long-run could accept
noticeably lower prices.
Production
This previously mentioned large production averaging about 14
—f — ■ —
James H. White, et al.. Budgets for Major Enterprises in the
Mississippi River Delta of Arkansas. Louisiana and Mississippi (Memphis
Tennessee: Farm Bureau Press, 1962). ~~~
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million bales and large inventories of government cotton, only make
it more difficult for prices to be determined by supply and demand.
If government inventories were not so large government intervention and
price supports in the cotton industry would be unnecessary. In like
manner this carry-over reflects the market losses sustained by cotton.
These losses to a large extent are the result of smaller markets for
cotton when production is increasing.
Table 3 shows the supply and distribution during 1963-1964, and
the USM estimates for 1964-1965.*
TABLE 3
SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUTION OF COTTON
,„,„ ,, USM Estimates
. 1963-64 1964-65
Beginning Inventory 11.2 12 4




Total Demand 14.2 14.9
It is the expectation of most men connected with cotton to
realize the USM estimates above with the help of recent cotton legis
lation. This Agricultural Act of 1964 provides for: (1) the equali
zation of costs of U. S. cotton between domestic and foreign mills, (2)
MacDonald N. Home, Jr., The Economic Outlook for Cotton Markets.
A paper delivered before the National Cotton Council Board of Directors,
Phoenix, Arizona (September 3, 1964),
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the creation of research projects designed to cut growing cost, (3)
the provision of per pound price supports to be decreased to 30
cents in 1964, 29% cents in 1965, and 29 cents thereafter, and (4)
the option to the fanner of selling part of his produce at world prices.
Additional reference to this legislation is made more specifically
in Chapter III. Reference is made here only to include the future
support prices for comparison with costs that will be faced by the
producer.
It is a fact of farm life that a farmer faced with a cut in the
price of his commodity is forced to produce more of, rather than less
in order to try to maintain his income. Regardless of the unit price
of whatever a farmer grows, there is no flexibility or slide in his
mortgage payments, taxes on farm machinery cost or living expenses.
Thus trying to off-set a decrease in the unit price the farmer creates
huge surpluses which tend to decrease prices more.1
But, high cost producers are those most apt to shift out of
cotton production. Such shifts are expected to make for a decreasing
effect on the necessary price. Thus those which stay profit in the
long-run by a reduction in the number of farmers.
Before dealing directly with prices, we would do well to look
at some of the economic conditions which cotton is produced in the
United States. It would moreover, be in order to say that prices of
key agricultural commodities are no longer determined by the forces of
James G. Fatton, The Case for Farmers (Washington, D. C.:
Public Affairs Press, 1959), p. 3.
a competitive market.
Economic Conditions
Specifically, cotton tends, naturally, to be produced under con
ditions close to those of pure competition. Producers are too numerous
for their individual production decisions to have any significant effect
on prices they receive. For this reason and others (the weather, the
length of the production period, etc.), the growers as individuals are
helpers to keep the supply in line with what the market will accept at
a reasonable price.
Thus, price has no tendency to guide production. When the
market weakens, there is no tendency for production to be restrained
for the purpose of avoiding a price break. Hence, in the absence of
some artificial influence, the price actually does break. In a word,
both supply and demand are inelastic to price changes in the short-run
and therefore, price does a poor job of keeping things in balance from
one season to the next. Supply is inelastic to price changes for the
reasons noted above. Demand is inelastic to price changes in the short
run because price is only one of the things which prompts a purchaser
to buy cotton. The others are promotion and research. The subjects
are discussed more in Chapter III.
Before proceeding further, it might be well to go a little
further into the economics of farm commodity pricing. The Diagram I,
page 10, makes the problem clearer. This diagram reflects the supply
and demand curve faced by the cotton industry.
1 —— , ,
MacDonald M. Home, Jr., The Economic Nature of Cotton. A paper
delivered before the Southern Economic Association, Raleigh, North
Carolina (November 17, 1956).
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Quantity
Fig. l.—This figure Reflects the supply and demand curve
faced by the industry.*
With demand and supply being inelastic with reference to price,
the equilibrium price is 0Pe; let the support price be OP . For the
s
support price to prevail, the government has to acquire the amount
BA. These government purchases have been made by the Commodity
Credit Corporation - an agency of the federal government.
The pnrchases have the effect of keeping demand and supply in
equality, to a degree, at the supported price. The government purchases
are made by the Commodity Credit Corporation extending loans to farmers
who use the crop (cotton) as collateral.
In this first chapter the writer has presented material relative
to cost faced by producers. These costs are given due weight in their
influence on support price determination. The amount of production was
also referred to in this chapter, since this chapter on the whole is
concerned with supply. It will become important as we talk about demand
"*
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in the final part of this paper.
The following chapter concerns itself with the purchases practices




GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS AND THE OPERATION OF THE COMMODITY
CREDIT CORPORATION
As previously mentioned, the United States Government controls,
to a large degree, many occurrences in the cotton industry. This is
also the case with some other farm products. It supports prices at a
level which will bring, what it thinks to be an adequate return to the
farmer. In a sense, price supports may well be keeping an excess
amount of farmers in the industry.
Large operators probably benefit most from the price supports.
These are the farmers who could possibly cut cost enough to make
reasonable profits while selling at world prices. The small farmer
would probably be displaced because, as a whole, he would have little
income as a result, of selling at world prices. Therefore, these
supports may be helpful in drecreasing the rate offiarm population mi
gration to industrial areas which do not have sufficient jobs to offer
the displaced people en masse.
Farm programs designed to help the farmers can be grouped into
four categories from the point of their effect on prices: (1) Those
which seek to limit or reduce the amount of production; (2) those which
are designed to control quantity, quality or rate of shipment from pro
ducing areas; (3) those which provide for loan purchase agreements, or
payments designed to maintain at specified level prices received by
farmers; and (4) those which are aimed at increasing the use of United
12
13
States farm products at home or abroad.
These types of programs mentioned above were instituted by the
Federal Government which has sought to stabilize cotton prices. The
Agriculture Stabilization and Conservation Service is the agency of the
United States Department of Agriculture which carries out the various
action programs in the general field of production adjustments, con
servation assistance, and price and market stabilization. This branch
of the government includes within it most of the operations of the
Commodity Credit Corporation.2
The discussion which follows deals mainly with categories one,
three, and four. These three categories are selected because of the
notoriety of their effect on cotton prices in the United States. Each
program mentioned is discussed in the light of its influence or antici
pated influence on the price of cotton.
Production Controls
An example of the first category is the Soil Bank Program which
was instituted in 1956 by the Federal Government. This program was
cnnceived as a means to pay farmers for reducing their acreage alloted
for the production of cotton. This land which was to remain idle was
then subject to approved conservation practices to avert erosion or any
other things detrimental to the soil.
1
U. S. Department of Agriculture, "What Makes Farmers' Prices,"
Agriculture Information Bulletin. 204, p. 21.
2
U. S. Department of Agriculture, ASCS Background Information.
BI No. 1, August, 1963.
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Payments under the Soil Bank Plan were made on a per acre basis
with the rate of payment varying with the productive capacity of the
land. During 1957, farmers received well over 600 million dollars in
payments for putting land in the Soil Bank Program. After the 1957
experience it became apparent that not enough money was available to
pay enough farmers to take out enough cropland.1 So the cost of such a
program to the taxpayers made it prohibitive. Nevertheless, as of
January, 1964, about 17.5 million acres were still included in this
program. And,although annual payments were to be made for the term of
the contract in effect, authority to put land in the program ended
2
with the 1960 program.
The effect of such controls has not been altogether heartening
on the industry. They have generally meant more extensive culti
vation of the permitted acreage. So with more fertilizer, better seed
and closer planting, the producer has been able to overcome the goals
of these restrictions; a cut back in crop yield. In other words the
producers have used better production techniques and therefore have
produced more cotton from less land.
It becomes evident upon inspection of the following table that
total land in production was reduced 58 per cent from 1952 to 1962, but
in the process of this reduction, the amount of land required to produce
one bale of cotton decreased by 41 per cent from 1.58 to 1.10 acres.
/» « A,lan R# Mrd> SurPlusaes...The Riddle of American A«rli..ifin.y«
(New York: Springer Publishing Co., 1964), pp. 47-48.
2
wt n "* /A De£artmfnL?f A8riculture» ASC Background Information.
BI, No. 5 (October, 1963), p. 12. "*
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TABLE 4





























































































































































U. S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
This is the same type of trend being established with reference to the
amount of man-hour required to produce a bale of cotton.
From this foregoing table, one can also see that the number of
bales has been rather steady. In fact, the number of bales produced
decreased only 2 per cent.
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On the other hand, consumption tends to fluctuate from a stable
to a downward trend. These trends complicate the problem more on
account of the large and increasing government inventories of cotton
which are used as collateral for non-recourse loans to farmers. The
implementation of these loans is mentioned later.
In this paper, it is necessary to cite such information and to
relate the economic consequences. This program, and others to be
referred to later, are conceived to bring effective supply more nearly
in line with effective demand for the product. With this done, other
things being equal, prices should respond favorably. Now, for a
brief discussion of category three mentioned above.
Loans and Purchase Agreement
This category refers to price support implementation and govern
ment purchases of cotton. These prices are the result of numerous
forces at work in the industry which lead to legislation. Before
seeking legislation, the legislators consider the views of people in
the industry. Their discussions are centered around world prices,
world market conditions, and the spread between the support price and
the farmers' price. They also consider domestic prices in relation to
the prices of competitors for the world cotton market. In short, these
people try to ascertain the nature and volume of supply and demand that
can be expected.
The supply is influenced by the marketing practices in the in
dustries. After production, cotton is baled into lots of about 500
pounds, then sampled before marketing for the purpose of classifying
each bale and grading it. Though each variety of cotton produces fibers
17
of very similar staple length, there may be a wide variation in this
length within the bale. However varied the length may be within the
bale, it is classified as being of the predominate length as judged
or measured. The classification referring to staple color and quality
has a direct relation to the demand for the cotton from the textile
mills. This is due to the fact that staple and color affect the amount
of mill wastage and, therefore, the cost to the cotton textile mills.
More pointedly, the significance of staple length cannot be over
emphasized since in spinning, the quality of the resulting produce will
be greatly reduced if a short fiber is used.2
These qualities are important in meeting the competition with
man-made products which have little wastage and which are of a uniform
staple length. Additional conanents on the market for cotton is dis
cussed in the next chapter. Here it is necessary only to cite the
practices within the industry in order to form a sound base for under
standing cotton pricing and cotton's competition for markets.
After classification, producers generally sell their ginned and
baled cotton to a local merchant at a price agreed upon in the light
of prevailing cotton prices and the cost of cotton futures. The
futures market stabilizes cotton prices through periods. Prevailing
prices are those at which cotton is selling in all the principal cotton
markets at a given time. The price is determined by a daily survey of
I " ' — ■
Jules Labarthe, Textiles Origins to Usage (New York: Macmillan




the commodity changes reported to the Department of Agriculture at the
termination of the day. This is referred to as spot cotton, meaning
cotton baled and ready for sale.*
Generally, the price is given for middling cotton with a staple
length of 15/16 of an inch, available for prompt delivery as reported
by the spot exchanges. The cotton grades vary up and down from this
middling grade, depending on staple length and color. American upland
cotton varies in length from 31/32 to 1 1/8 inch but may be in either
of the colors mentioned in the included table.
The official references to the length of staple and grade of
American upland cotton are as follows, in Table 5.
According to the National Cotton Council, the medium staple
cotton, American upland, accounted for about 84 per cent of the
American domestic cotton crop. The magnitude dictates the interest
given to this type of cotton.
The present economy-minded Johnson administration has given in
dications that it may be moving toward an era of lower agricultural
support and freer cotton marketing. A hint of this tendency was
evidenced in the announcement that the cotton price support would be
lowered to 29 cents this year from 30 cents in 1964. Furthermore,
the U. S. Department of Agriculture, while lowering the support loan
rate has raised the direct payment to farmers who cut acreage to 65
per cent of their allotment, from 3.50 to 4.35 cents. The two moves,
hopefully, will bring down cotton output allowing the government to
1
Labarthe, op. cit.. Ill, p. 133.
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TABLE 5













































Strict low middling tinged
Low middling tinged
Light Spotted Cotton
Good middling light spotted
Strict middling light spotted
Middling light spotted
Strict low middling light spotted





Strict low middling spotted
Low middling spotted
Light Gray Cotton
Good middling light gray
Strict middling light gray
Middling light gray
Strict low middling light gray
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TABLE 5 - Continued
Grades
Yellow Stained Cotton Gray Cotton
Good middling gray
Good middling yellow stained Strick middling gray
Strict middling yellow stained Middling gray




fas m"' ?i* DoPaftm!nt °f A§riculture, How Cotton is Sold for
FAS - M - 71, Revised June, 1964. ' „
reduce the CCC stocks which may rise to some 14 million bales this
year.1
In addition to the market for cotton ginned, baled, and ready
for delivery, there exists another type of market. In this type of
transaction one may buy cotton for future delivery, or one may sell
cotton at what appears to be a very high price, gambling that when
the cotton crop is ready, the spot price will be lower; thus, when
called upon to fill the order it can be obtained in the market at a
lower price than that which the sale was contracted for months before.
Producers do not deal in future contracts, but these activities help
to stabilize the cotton market price.2
2
Labarthe, op. cit.. p. 133.
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The Commodity Credit Corporation
The agency of the government making loans to farmers is the
Commodity Credit Corporation. It is one of the strangest corporations
ever chartered by the state of Delaware. This is true because it is
one of the most non-profit corporations ever created. It is non
profit because most farmers never retake their commodity and pay the
loans they receive.
The capital stock originally was held jointly by the governor
of the Farm Credit Administration and the Secretary of Agriculture.
Its purpose was to work "loans without recourse," for eligible farmers.
This phrase meant that if the market price of the cotton used as
collateral fell below the supported price, the farmer could per
manently turn the crop over to the Commodity Credit Corporation. The
farmer, then, was somewhat of a unique debtor in that he was not re
quired to pay his debt. If the market price rose above the support
price, the farmer could pay off his loan, retake his crop and the re
sulting profit. In short the farmer cannot lose.
The Commodity Credit Corporation has caused large rarm
operators to produce just for inventory, 90 per cent of which is held
by the Commodity Credit Corporation. In 1956, 14 million bales were
carried over, this was the result of a bumper crop the previous year.
From 1957 through 1961, the carry-over was diminishing noticeably each
year. From this time forward man-made fibers have re-newed their
attacks on cotton markets. Large carry overs have resulted in years
since 1961.
Moreover, another point which throws more light on the situation
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is that these support prices are the result of hearings held by
legislative bodies who have the large operator in mind. More pointedly,
the large farm operators are getting astronomical sums in the area of
payment to keep land out of production or benefiting from relatively
high price supports while their unit cost of production is small com
pared to small farmers with approximately thirty-five to forty acres
of cotton. We will say more relative to this when we discuss the
market for cotton.
In this chapter, we have looked at some things which influence
the effective supply of cotton and some marketing practices prevalent
in the industry. Looked at in the eyes of an economist, this paper
could easily be said to be a study of supply and demand. These are
most important when discussing things that influence price. We will
discuss the latter notably demand, in the following part of this
paper.
CHAPTER III
AN ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET FOR COTTON
Domestic Market
It has been apparent in the preceeding sections of this paper
that farmers have made enviable gains in production through the use
of improved methods and modern production technology. These strides
may be percieved easily by looking at the trends mentioned pre
viously. - But these gains have not been unqualified blessings for the
cotton farmer in the United States. Such quasi-benefits have been
to a large extent nullified by the size of the market for American
Upland Cotton. From 1935 to the present, mill consumption of man-
made fiber has increased steadily. Over the long-run the market for
cotton produced in the United States has declined. Its portion had
decreased to a point where in 1963, cotton held only 45.5 per cent
of the total fiber market. Most cotton farmers could not long
survive with the price implications of such a market, especially since
the support price is lower each year.
Ultimately, prices will have to go at the prevailing world
price, contend knowledgeable people within the industry. The world
rate for middling one-inch cotton is now about 23$ per pound.
Obviously, world prices are carefully watched because farm legisla
tors have been made aware of the tremendous influence of cotton
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prices on the size of the market for American Upland Cotton.
It is generally conceded by the better informed authorities
that the health of the cotton industry in the long-run will depend
on (1) its ability to cut costs, (2) research to find newer and pro
fitable uses of cotton, (3) adequate promotion for the product, and
(4) better markets.
Since the production costs have been discussed at some length
in Chapter I, these costs are not discussed in more detail here, and
only brief reference is made to comparative staple fiber purchase
costs to buyers of these materials. After some statement relative to
the economics of cotton production, a further discussion emphasises
and analyzes to a degree, the market for American Upland Cotton.
Where profitable, to increase understanding of the subject, material
concerning research and promotion for the product is included.
It seems fairly clear that these previously mentioned deter
minants have not been aggressively pursued in the past because of
the basic economics of production and the geographical location of
the primary producers of cotton in the United States. Even now the
larger part of the supply of cotton produced in the United States is
produced by small farmers who are not adequately versed in production
technology to have competitive costs.
Previously some of the attributes of farm economics were in
spected. Now attention is directed toward an inquiry into some per
tinent consideration in the cotton market which are related to
conditions as seen in the American economy.
As a prelude to this discussion it may be said that most cotton
producers have not had a realization of the need for adequate
research relative to their product. It is not difficult to say why
this has not been existent to a great extent. The average farmer
does not see himself as a businessman, i.e. the producer of a
primary product which is used in the manufacturing of numerous end
products. Therefore he has not aggressively promoted his product or
conducted research for more and better products as his competitors
have done. As a result cotton consumption has decreased measurably.
The consumption of cotton is influenced by the health of
American Economy as is the case with other fibers. Since 1961, the
American economy has been growing at an acceptable rate, while
achieving unprecedented heights. In other words, the economy has
been on the increase, or up-phase of the business cycle. Within
this general cycle numerous other industry-wide cycles fluctuate
within this context. Speaking broadly, the textile industry is no
exception to this rule. Hence, we will here try to see whether the
cotton industry in the U. S. has benefited from this up-phase of
the business cycle. This would influence the rate of fiber con
sumption as the mills would buy large amounts of cotton.
Figure 2, page 26, does much to explain the situation.
Back in 1959 and 1960, Cotton held on very well to its full
share of the total fiber market-about 55 per cent. But early in
1961, it began to lose to man-made fibers at a tragic rate, as the
preceeding chart shows. This chart shows clearly that total fiber
consumption has risen along with cotton from 1961. One can surmise
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Fig. 2.--Fiber Consumption by the U. S. Textile Industry.'
M. K. Home, Jr. and Frank McCord, Price and Today Market
for U. S. Cotton (Memphis Tennessee: National Cotton Council, 1962),
p. 20.
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market swept upward very strongly. But during the same time the rise
in cotton consumption was noticeably weak in comparison with the rise
of all textile fibers.
Had cotton held on to the same percentage of the market through
the entire period since 1960 -- i.e. 55 per cent — cotton consumption
would have risen to an annual rate of 10.5 million bales by the first
quarter of 1964. But mills were actually consuming cotton at the
rate of only 8.4 million bales and the difference between these two
figures is the measure of the competitive loss during this time —
over two million bales.
Thus, it is very easy to conclude that U. S. cotton has loss
ground against its competitors -- and when the cycle turns down,
consumption may well be even less because of the competitive losses
which have already been sustained.
Now* we will survey the market for cotton in more specific
terms. The following table shows fifteen of cotton's largest markets
which accounted for 57 per cent of the U. S. cotton consumption in
1961. One may say that five years, in cotton,is a long time when
referring to markets. But it is evident that certain meaningful
trends can be recognized in the industry. Within the total picture
one can deduce certain relationships between the markets which are
pertinent to future growth. At first sight we see that the larger
demand is within the wearing apparel grouping and things used in the
home. More specifically, the last reference is made to sheets, pillow
cases, towels, and drapery. To get a clearer picture, particular types
1
M. K. Home, Jr., and Frank A. McCord, Price and Today's
Market for U. S. Cotton (Memphis, Tennessee: National Cotton Council
1962), p. 14. »
28
TABLE 6





Underwear (Men and Boys) 325
Dresses (Women and Misses) 309
Drapery - Upholstery 288
Retail - Piece Goods 208
Rugs and Carpets 250
Industrial Threads 178
Bedspreads, Children's 172




M. K. Home, Jr. and Frank A. McCord, Price and Todays'
Markets for U. S. Cotton (Memphis, Tenn.: National Cotton Council,
1962).
of markets have been pulled out of the total market and amounts from
additional years have been added to see trends if possible.
At first sight it seems that the "backbone market" are those
in which the demand elasticity with regards to income or taste is
practically zero. This is because of the respective end uses in the
29
TABLE 7
CLASSES OF COTTON MARKETS*''
(1000 BALES)
End Use Cotton Consumption
1955 1960
Cotton Shares





















































































in the group. The consumer would not need an appreciably larger
amount of the items were his income to increase. But cotton is not
holding on to these markets as indicated by the decline in the per
centage of cotton used in the manufacture of these products.
The 1962 figures, with reference to the growth market, show that
cotton's share has leveled off and turned down. This is without a
doubt due to the competitive gains of the man-made products such as
rayon, nylon, and dacron. This, moreover, is the market which could
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have a comparatively large degree of income elasticity. This is the
case because people tend to consume more of these types products as their
income increases. In other words, there is usually a direct relation
ship between income and the amount of effective demand. Thus as the
amount of usable income increased the demand for the quantity of
cotton used would increase. As a result larger markets would prevail.
Some markets have been sheltered from competititon because no
fiber with a competitive price provided the comfort, launderability,
and durability required in these uses. But the so-called "high wet
strength" rayons have threatened to tear away this shelter and expose
all of cotton's domestic market to competition with favorable price
relationships providing the opportunity. For example, sheets and
pillowcases which are made completelyof cotton in comparison with
those which are 60 per cent cotton and 40 per cent modification of
rayon have different material costs. It costs six cents per sheet
more in the former than in the latter. In more detail the com
parative cost is discussed below.
Table 8, page 31, gives some indication of the amount of dis
parity in price between cotton and some man-made fibers. The prices
are quoted with reference to cost per pound for each material used.
In order to measure the difference more closely, the com
parison uses 213 grades of cotton comprising more than 99 per cent
of the cotton crop in recent years. These prices were taken from the
designated markets of all the 213 qualities mentioned in Chapter II,
and weighted with constant weights. The resulting prices are the




December December December December
1959 I960 1962 1963






















M. K. Home, Jr., The Economic Outlook for U. S. Cotton. A
Report before the Twenty-Sixth Annual Meeting at Biloxi, Mississippi
January 24, 1964. * '
Of course the prices are not comparable still, because cotton
has a higher waste factor, and the man-made fiber prices are de
livered to the mill. But it is still believed that relevant con
clusions can be drawn.
In 1960, Rayon was reduced by four cents and another two cents
the next two years for a net reduction of six cents per pound. From
December of 1962, to December of 1963, the price rose by three cents.
It was uncomfortably clear to people in the industry that they were
selling all of the rayon staple they could manufacture.1 No doubt,
they had to ration their supplies to secure extra profit with a price
hike.
M. K. Home, Jr., The Economic Outlook for Cotton in the U S
A paper given before the National Cotton Board of Trustees at "''
Phoenix, Arizona (September 3, 1964), p. 15.
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Understanding the foregone effect, this price of rayon would
have on the cotton market, cotton men both in and out of Congress
could see clearly what was happening. With the future of the cotton
market in mind, the legislator enacted an amendment to the Agriculture
Adjustment Act of 1938 which, among other things, would pay domestic
textile manufacturers CCC payments-in-kind to offset the difference
between their costs for domestic cotton and a lower world price for
domestic cotton that permitted foreign textile manufacturers to
undersell American textile manufacturers in the American market.1
The reader can get a better view of the effect of this legis
lation on cotton prices by just thinking in terms of average spot
market prices for cotton. Middling inch cotton on the official
spot market is now 30.77 cents in comparison with somewhat more
than thirty-three cents during most of last season. From the 30,77
cents we subtract the 6% cents payment, and have a net price for
middling inch of 24.27. This gives an impression of how much the
2
price has come down.
To see the relationship of prices now, we compare this with
the price for rayon. Few people thought that the price of staple
rayon would remain at the level of 28 cents if the price of cotton
was reduced by nine cents per pound. They have not as yet announced
any reduction in price but they are likely to do so. The lowest they
have ever gone on standard quality rayon for the general market was 25
I —— , . ___
n » U\S\,C°df ConSressional and Administrative News, West Publishing
Co., No. 7, May 5, 1964. e
2
Home, op. cit.. p. 6.
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cents. It was at this level for a short time in 1962.
As a result of these price adjustments, cotton will be about as
competitive as it was in 1959 and early 1960. With these price re
lationships marketing groups have a basis for increasing their reliance
on other factors which help in securing market for a product. Speci
fically, they are now placing greater emphasis on research and pro
motion in the cotton industry.
Prices are tremendously important in competitive productive
schemes but over the long pull, research and promotion are necessary
if an industry is to sustain a comparatively large market. In the
past, these avenues have not been pursued by cotton producer organi
zation to any large degree. Now, cotton handlers and producers are
beginning to face reality in the competitive set-up by giving cotton
a chance it has not previously had in research and promotion.
In the area of research the Cotton Producers Institute has in
stituted a program to check some of the highly advertised claims of
the polyester-fiber blends and of modified-rayon blends as compared
with treated cottons in wash-and-wear performance. This work gives
the industry basis for even stronger confidence in cotton's quality
2
than it had before.
Also in promotion cotton seems to be vastly stronger today
than ever before of the use which is being made of the C.P.I, funds.
For the first time the industry can appeal directly to consumers on
I




a large scale through T.V. and fashion magazines.
This, is very important because production is geared to the
taste of the consumer. Competitors with their knowledge of this basic
principle and a competitive price have stolen a large part of the
cotton market.
The declining market for cotton has established itself in
American economic history since the Great Depression. Some recent
figures will show the magnitude of the problem cotton farmers now
face. The following table shows that cotton has lost in a period of
nine years, from 1955 to 1964, 10 per cent of its market to man-made
goods. Although the greatest percentage increase was made by non-
cellulosic products. In terms of greater percentage of the market
held by man-made fiber, rayon and acetate are the leaders.
A general conclusion is that if U. S. cotton is to sustain
itself and make gains in the American market, a diversified approach
to marketing will have to be existent in the industry. No one con
sideration in this approach should be included to the exclusion of
another, equally as important variable. There are also limitations
regarding such an approach.
Foreign Market
As a finale to the discussion of the market for cotton, the
nature and magnitude of the foreign market is considered. Foreign
consumption of U. S. Cotton is becoming increasingly important because
of the American cotton industry's search for more markets for its
products. Specifically, it is estimated that of 80 million acres
TABLE 9
COTTON AND MAN-MADE STAPLE FIBER CONSUMED ON COTTON SYSTEM SPINNING SPINDLES
1955 TO DATE*




























































































































Table 14, Cotton Situation. November, 1964, CS-215, p. 24.
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harvested in the 1963-64 crop year, the produce of one out of every
four acres harvested was used for export.
Basically, it could be said that on the whole, many of the
variables which influence the market for foreign cotton, and its
price, are very similar to the nature of the United States complex
involving cotton. Similarly, some points discussed in this chapter
could just as well have been included in the former part. We have
included it here because of its general philosophy and impact on
foreign competition. More specifically, we are referring to the
two price-policy and recent legislation related to foreign pricing.
These topics will be delved into later in the chapter.
Al the outset a look at foreign production in comparison with
foreign consumption is in order to get a first hand view of the
situation* Since 1947, cotton production in foreign free world
countries has risen faster than consumption. The average annual in
crease in production has been 756,000 bales and the average annual
increase in consumption has been 682,000 bales.2 Still, the United
States exports of upland cotton in 1964-65 are expected to total
about 5.2 million bales a year. This included the market in 1947
plus the average annual increase. Thus foreign consumption has had
Delta Farm Press, Greenville, Mississippi, December 10,
1964, p. 5.
2
United States Department of Agriculture, Outlook for Cotton
in 1965. November 19, 1964, p. 5. "~~~ ~"
3
Horne, Jr., op. cit.. p. 7.
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an average rise of seven or eight hundred thousand bales a year. It
is the thinking of men connected with cotton though that this could
possibly be increased measurably since the average European only uses
about half as much cotton as the average American. This may be
because the climate and topography for the most part are not suitable
for the production of cotton. So, the fiber is either man-made or
imported.
These new trade patterns which are developing in Europe could
mean a vast market for United States cotton according to the
President of Cotton Council International. R. Keith Walden, of Tuscon,
Arizona notes that the six countries that make up the European Economic
Community - Belgium, Holland, Luxenbourg, France, Germany and Italy
have a combined population of 170 million. All the rest of free
Europe are expected to join eventually, which would mean a market for
more than 7.5 million bales of cotton a year compared with about 9
million for the United States. If the Europeans used 75 per cent as
much cotton as the average American this would mean a potential market
for 14 million bales in the long run. Different programs pursuant to
the realization of these figures are financed 50-50 by overseas industry
groups and the United States Department of Agriculture, using Public
Law 480. The decision as to what will be used in either market depends
in large measure on cost, quality and consumer demand, as was the case
in the domestic analysis.1
To complicate the problem further, man-made fiber competitors
Home, Jr., op. cit.
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have been pressing down upon cotton, keeping its market from growing
faster. These synthetics by themselves, have gained an average of
800,000 cotton bales a year for the past five years in foreign
markets.
The main reason for such growth in the foreign market was a
dual pricing system, which in effect forced the United States mills
to pay from six cents to eight and one-half cents per pound more for
their raw materials than do their foreign competition. The system
has made for a rising tide of cotton textiles imports from foreign
mills, a growing encroachment by foreign mills, and an over-all
2
reduction in cotton consumption, lowest since 1958. The American
manufacturers termed these unfair, and conducive to the building of
cotton textile imports at the expense of domestic products.
Because of the harmful effect of two-priced cotton, the
United States government has passed legislation which went into
effect April 11, 1964 making one price. To get this effect, the
Federal Government is making a payment in kind equivalent to 6%
cents per pound, the present spread between domestic and foreign
price, to any handler of cotton beyond the original grower.
The payment, which represents the difference between the 30
cents a pound domestic price of cotton and the world market price
of 23% cents a pound is in the form of a certificate equivalent to
the appropriate dollar value and enabling the recipient to draw
cotton from the government owned stock.^
I —— _
Business Week. April 11, 1964, p. 34.
2
Hew York Times, March 27, 1965, p. 31.
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In addition, wage cost for the foreign mill are not as high as
those in the United States. Therefore, the mills are capable of
breaking even faster and under selling the United States mills.
This has been one of the main reasons for the increase in cotton
imports. These foreign imports served markets that were previously
held by American cotton. The differences in costs previously mentioned
added to the practice also.
With this type of pricing textiles produced from United States
cotton will be more competitive with imports and should break the
gaines being posted by foreign producers. Last year cloth imports
amounted to 468 million square yards up some 230 per cent over the
1958 figure.1
Also, this gives a basis for the United States producer to
pursue the export market more strongly. Since prices are at world
rates (23 cents per pound) foreign consumption should respond to
the efforts of cotton Council International. This takes on more
significance as we note the rise of the synthetic fibers, which are
higher priced than cotton and depend very heavily on their big pro
motion programs to take the market away from cotton.2
The probable effect of going back to the two-priced system
was put rather conclusively by William E. Reid, President of Reigel
Textile Corporation:
Let me say quite simply that we have one price
Business Week, op. cit.. p. 34.
2
New York Times, op. cit.. p. 30.
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cotton and it must be retained. If it is not, if
cotton marketing is returned to a two price system,





It is evident to the writer from the material presented, that
the variable which influence prices in the cotton industry, are on
the whole causing a down pull on price. Moreover, major adjustments
will have to be made within the industry in order to conquer these
problems.
We have presented material showing that the spread between
cost and price on 80 per cent of the cotton crop, produced by tractor
power and hand harvested or produced by animal power and hand
harvested are not sufficient. Also, it has been shown how the
cost per pound of producing cotton is influenced by soil type, farm
size and level of technology and that only those medium to large size
farms using advance technology produce at cost which are lower than
the world price of twenty-three cents per pound.
Moreover, the United States Government supports prices of
cotton at a level in excess of the world prices of cotton. Its
programs to control the amount of production have been largely in
effective. This fact goes a long way in explaining why rayon and the
other man-made products have taken such a large part of the markets
which were formerly 100 per cent cotton market.
In general, the gains in certain segments of the domestic market
have been nullified by losses in other segment of this market thereby
41
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making the carry-over still large. The major factor here has been
price. But with the veto of the depressing two-price system, avenues
and opening which can reduce the losses and gain markets for the
United States cotton are given additional strength. This pricing system
has done much in its short history to stop foreign textile companies
from buying the United States cotton, then producing goods in other
countries and selling the final products in the United States at a
lower price. The two-price practice produced the effect in the recent
past of making cotton cheaper for a smaller foreign market at the ex
pense of the larger domestic market.
Europe is in the midst of a large economic expansion carrying
higher incomes to larger numbers of people. Europe in general and
the European Economic Community in particular should constitute an
increasing market for American cotton. In fact, the value of the
United States cotton products sold in Europe has increased three-fold
from 1956 to 1963. The equalization of cotton prices in the United
States have also helped this tendency. Moreover, the soil of Western
Europe is not generally considered to be suitable for the production
of cotton. This adds to the attractiveness of the market for the
American farmer. With this in mind the newly formed Cotton Council
International is seeking to take advantage of the new trade patterns
being established in Europe.
Furthermore, it is the opinion of this writer that in the long-
run the supply and the demand will have to be given more freedom in
determining price. The price will ultimately have to be decreased to
the world price which is now about twenty-three cents per pound. With
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this done in conjunction with the other strides being made in the
fields of research to get more markets and promotion on a more ag
gressive scale, cotton can regain its prestige in world markets.
Yet, more adjustments will have to be made in order for a
larger number of production units to be of economic size. In other
words, more farms will have to be of economic size. More pointedly,
there is a surplus amount of farmers which price supports keep in the
industry. As previously mentioned, these price supports have done
much to destroy markets for cotton. The effect of adjustments, on
those leaving cotton production could be made less harmful if the
Federal Government would train the people who leave for suitable em
ployment. However, the price of cotton could be supported for the
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